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Abstract
Crowdsourcing, together with its related approaches, has become very
popular in recent years. All crowdsourcing processes involve the partici-
pation of a digital crowd, a large number of people that access a single In-
ternet platform or shared service. In this paper we explore the possibility
of applying formal methods, typically used for the verification of software
and hardware systems, in analysing the behavior of a digital crowd. More
precisely, we provide a formal description language for specifying digital
crowds. We represent digital crowds in which the agents do not directly
communicate with each other. We further show how this specification can
provide the basis for sophisticated formal methods, in particular formal
verification.
1 Introduction
Crowdsourcing is an umbrella term used to describe a wide range of activities
coordinated within an Internet-based platform. It’s original definition is by
Howe:
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Simply defined, crowdsourcing represents the act of a company or
institution taking a function once performed by employees and out-
sourcing it to an undefined (and generally large) network of people in
the form of an open call. This can take the form of peer-production
(when the job is performed collaboratively), but is also often under-
taken by sole individuals. The crucial prerequisite is the use of the
open call format and the large network of potential laborers. [23]
In the most general sense, therefore, crowdsourcing can be defined as the busi-
ness practice of a “seeker” entity, attempting to out-source activities, such as
solving problems, performing tasks or raising funds, to a priori unidentified un-
dertakers, namely the “crowd”. Crowdsourcing has a wide range of potential
applications and is the basis for many successful businesses; as such it has also
emerged as a new and vibrant research area [54].
The ubiquitous component of all the crowdsourcing processes is the crowd or,
more specifically, the digital crowd. In English, the term “crowd” is used to refer
to a large number of people that are in each other’s immediate presence [28].
To distinguish our terminology from this we use “digital crowd” to refer to a
large number of agents that access a single Internet platform or shared service,
i.e., a large number of agents that are in each other’s immediate e-presence. The
agents can represent individual people, organisations, other web-based services,
etc.
Crowdsourcing is, foremost, a business practice and the methods of man-
aging and analysing it are “practical” rather than “formal”. To the best of
our knowledge, there are no formal methods to verify various requirements,
for example, to determine when crowdsourcing is an adequate approach to a
problem, under which conditions crowdsourcing will be successful, how effective
crowdsourcing can be on a particular problem, whether a digital crowd can be
expected to solve a problem successfully, etc. Our aim is to explore whether for-
mal methods can be applied to improving the understanding and effectiveness
of digital crowds.
1.1 Varieties of Digital Crowds
Originally covered by the umbrella term, “crowdsourcing”, a range of applica-
tions involving digital crowds have been developed, incorporating many different
agent structures and different interaction protocols. Some initial attempts to
develop a taxonomy for the growing number of crowdsourcing varieties, have
been made [40, 13].
We consider some, but by no means all, crowdsourcing practices, from the
viewpoint of the interaction between the seeker and the digital crowd and the
communication among the digital crowd participants. We would like to empha-
sise that because of the lack of a comprehensive common taxonomy, and since
the terms for different processes partially overlap among different taxonomists,
the names used for each process here may be considered imprecise by some or
inadequate by others. We follow to some extent the crowdsourcing taxonomy
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developed in [13] as a recent approach that encompasses and builds upon earlier
work.
Crowdcasting is possibly the earliest and best understood example of a
crowdsourcing process. Here, a seeker advertises an open challenge to the crowd
and offers a financial reward for one solution, e.g., the best or the first. Seekers
can be people, businesses, or representatives of larger institutions, but each is
represented by, and acts as, one agent. The challenges can range from small
creative tasks such as the design of a logo, to grand challenges for solving com-
plicated technical problems. The crowd that responds to crowdcasting is usually
comprised of people that have the adequate skills to solve the challenge, though
no certification is required that participants possess such skills. People can
solve the tasks individually, or work in teams. However, it is not the aim of the
platform to facilitate the finding of team-mates.
The 99designs (99designs.co.uk) system is a platform that enables seekers to
advertise their design needs and proposed rewards. The platform users wishing
to respond to a seeker do so by sending in their design proposals. The seeker
chooses the preferred design solution and rewards the proponent of that solution.
The respondents are typically individuals and all communication is done via the
platform. In contrast, Innocentive (www.innocentive.com) is a platform where
difficult technical challenges are posed, for which a solution may not even exist.
Here, the respondents are typically teams of people who already know each
other, with varied skill sets, that share the prize if awarded.
Crowdcomputing is a general term we use to name the many processes
whereby a seeker defines an end goal that is to be accomplished by the crowd
participants. Each of the participants contributes a fractional effort towards ac-
complishing that goal. One of these processes is microtasking, a process where
a vast number of very simple tasks that take little time and effort to solve are
created by the seeker. The task solvers are almost exclusively individuals, and
the rewards are small. The rewards for the crowd might be monetary or an
intrinsic motivation maybe induced in the participants to inspire them to con-
tribute, e.g., altruism or entertainment. As in crowdcasting, the platforms do
not offer any means for communication among members of the crowd. However,
in contrast to crowdcasting one task is given to one solver, and thus all solutions
are paid for. To ensure that the solutions are of a satisfactory standard, the
solvers must be certified before they can be assigned tasks.
Representative examples of microtasking crowdcomputing platforms with
financial rewards are Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (www.mturk.com), and Crowd-
Flower (crowdflower.com). An example of a crowdcomputing process where the
rewards are entertainment rather than monetary are when they are organised
as a game with a purpose. Here, the game is hosted by the platform, the partic-
ipants solve the tasks by playing the game and their reward is the pleasure de-
rived from playing. In this type of crowdcomputing, pre-certification is not nec-
essary. A typical example is the DNA puzzle game for multi-sequence alignment
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Phylo developed by the McGill Centre for Bioinformatics (phylo.cs.mcgill.ca).
Common to all these processes is the fact that although the crowd partic-
ipants solve a problem jointly, they do not actually collaborate, are not aware
of, nor depend on, the solutions of the other crowd participants.
Crowdcontent, as described by [13] includes the processes in which a content
is created, analysed or discovered by a digital crowd. The term “Wisdom of the
Crowds” or “Collective Intelligence”, can also be considered to include these
processes. The abilities, information and motivation of the digital crowd’s par-
ticipants are combined, resulting in the emergence of new abilities, information
and intentionality. While to some extent this is true with crowdsourcing pro-
cesses such as Mechanical Turk, there is a notable difference; in Mechanical Turk
the tasks, called “human intelligence tasks” require no particular cognitive effort
to perform and all tasks requested by each individual seeker are similar. With
collective intelligence, the tasks are not given to the crowd, but the members
contribute cognitively more demanding efforts in response to what they perceive
is necessary to complete the larger goal. Furthermore, while in the crowdcom-
puting processes the participants work independently, here they consider and
build upon the work of others, though direct communication among the partic-
ipants is not strictly necessary. In [13] the crowdcontent processes are further
differentiated into crowd production, crowd searching, and crowdanalysing, the
terms being self-explanatory.
While collective intelligence is a phenomenon that occurs spontaneously in
some systems, platforms can be designed specifically with the task of promoting
such collective efforts. In this case, the platform is the seeker, looking for infor-
mation and abilities, as well as assigning tasks to the digital crowd. Possibly the
best example of this crowdsourcing activity is Wikipedia (www.wikipedia.org)1.
Typically no material payment is associated with this subtype of crowdcomput-
ing process, the reward being advancement of a common good.
Crowdvoting is a crowdsourcing process in which a platform only promotes
or sells those goods and services that are supported by the majority of the digital
crowd. In another variant, crowdvoting is a method of eliciting an opinion only
from the community that is interested in a particular issue. An example of
a crowdvoting platform is Threadless (beta.threadless.com). Threadless is a
platform on which the seekers are designers who can submit garment illustration
designs, while the crowd assigns approval to the designs that they like. Designs
that achieve a certain number of votes are printed and offered for sale on the
platform, with profits being transferred to the seekers.
An example that conceptually lies between crowdvoting and crowdcomput-
ing is a collaborative effort such as writing a scenario for a movie together, as
instigated by Paul Verhoeven2 or drafting alterations to a constitution, as is the
1Though the lack of unanimity from the crowd makes Wikipedia an atypical example. We
are grateful to the anonymous reviewer who pointed this out.
2http://www.bbc.com/culture/story/20130807-the-public-cant-write
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case with Iceland3.
The processes by which the crowd chooses an item, such as in Threadless
(beta.threadless.com) is termed crowdopinion in [13], while the processes by
which the crowd changes the good they are creating until there are no objec-
tions, as is the case with writing a scenario or a constitution, is termed crowd
storming. What these processes have in common is that unlike the others men-
tioned earlier, crowd participants can appear to interact with each other directly,
and even collaborate directly towards the creation of the end good. However,
even in these processes, the communication is actually executed via the hosting
platform, namely the participants do not send private messages to each other
and all communication is accessible to the whole digital crowd.
Crowdfunding is different from other crowdsourcing processes, and one of
the least ambiguous. In crowdfunding the seeker does not out-source a task,
but advertises a fund-raising project. The digital crowd does not compete,
but participates, as they are donors that pledge their own funds and resources
towards the accomplishment of the project. A seeker may directly advertise a
project or it may do so trough a moderator. As in crowdcasting, seekers and
donors can be individuals, teams, or even companies, but crowd members are
not expected to communicate with each other or collaborate. The seekers can
look to raise funds to finance their business venture, micro-loans or charity offers
for non-profit organisations.
A crowdfunding platform that matches seekers looking to finance a business
ventures is Kickstarter (www.kickstarter.com). The donors’ funds are given
with no return on investment up to a certain value or with some minor goods
in return over a certain value. Kiva4 (www.kiva.org) is a platform that manages
micro-loans to private individuals. More precisely, Kiva first establishes contact
with moderators, which are traditional loan-givers and repayment enforcers, and
a seeker who is requesting a loan from the moderators. The stories and needs of
the seekers are passed on to Kiva by the moderators. These stories are advertised
by Kiva to the donors who then transfer money to Kiva, which distributes it
to the moderators. The money is loaned to the seekers and, when returned, is
repaid to the donors. Kiva’s task is to manage the moderators to ensure that
funds end up in the hands of the seekers. Platforms that handle traditional
fund-raising projects are Global Giving (www.globalgiving.org) for charity and
Indiegogo (www.indiegogo.com) for both charity and personal projects.
Smart Mobs represent a hybrid between a digital and a physical crowd [39].
Smart mobs are not a crowdsourcing process, however we do consider them here
because they involve a digital crowd.
Smart mobs do not utilise a crowdsourcing platform exclusively for their
purpose, as these are one-off activities. A generic platform, such as an Internet
forum, is used to coordinate the activities of an actual crowd, which as a result
3http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2012-10/23/iceland-crowdsourced-constitution
4Although Kiva was created before crowdfunding became popular.
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is formed deliberately, is purposeful and is efficient. A seeker, typically an
instigator, advertises a cause and gives the specifications of the activity he or she
wants to occur. Those from the digital crowd that wish to participate respond
by following the activity specification and, as a result, an actual physical crowd
may form.
A concept related to smart mobs is Internet vigilantism. As in a smart mob,
a seeker posts a cause and a description of activity to a generic platform while
responders participate by complying. A seeker may act as an individual in a
single instance of vigilantism or as a complex entity that frequently takes on
vigilantism activities e.g., Anonymous [31]. Seekers in the context of Internet
vigilantism engage in a wider range of activities that may or may not result
in physical crowd formation. For example, a seeker may describe a perceived
injustice and solicit the help of the digital crowd to seek out the perpetrators
and expose their identities to the authorities or to the public. Seekers may also
advertise a smart mob activity but with the purpose of vigilantism in the cyber
space, such as a coordinated distributed denial-of-service attack to an Internet
service.
Common to all digital crowds we consider here is that the participants in the
crowd do not communicate directly and privately with each other. In the rare
instance when there is a need to communicate with another crowd participant,
the participant directs this communication to the crowdsourcing platform that
hosts the crowd, and it is the platform that relays the message. In the rest
of this work we focus on an abstract digital crowd, not specific for any one
crowdsourcing process, in which the communication between crowd and seeker,
as well as among crowd participants, is executed via a mutual crowd hosting
platform.
1.2 Formal Methods
Formal methods represent a collection of techniques and tools for the specifi-
cation, development and verification of software and hardware systems. These
techniques are typically based on mathematical structures and formal logic and
so provide clear and unambiguous descriptions of required behaviour. This log-
ical basis then provides the opportunity for sophisticated analysis tools to be
utilised, for example based on logical proof or exhaustive state-space explo-
ration. Verification is the process of establishing that a designed system has its
intended properties. Formal verification has become widespread, enabling deep
and (semi) automated formal analysis of systems and so providing greater clar-
ity concerning reliability and correctness. The behaviour of complex systems,
even in a restricted environment, can easily become unpredictable making ver-
ifiability a very desirable quality in such systems.
Our long-term aim is to use an automated formal verification technique
called model-checking [5] to analyse digital crowd systems. However, in order to
achieve this a strong and logically precise logical basis for crowd systems must
be developed; this is the issue we address here. Model-checking has previously
been applied to the analysis of multi agent systems [35, 9] so it is a plausible
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technology to target for the analysis of digital crowds. A Multi Agent System
(MAS) is an artificial system containing (possibly among other entities) a set
of agents and managing the communication between them. Although a digital
crowd is a system of agents, it cannot be considered to be straight-forward MAS
in the traditional sense of this paradigm (we elaborate on this in Section 2).
1.3 Multi-Agent Systems (MAS)
The definition of what constitutes an ‘agent’ varies among disciplines. In com-
puter science and artificial intelligence, an agent is typically defined as
“an encapsulated computer system that is situated in some envi-
ronment, and that is capable of flexible, autonomous action in that
environment in order to meet its design objectives” [25].
Further, an agent is usually considered to be responsive with respect to other
agents and its environment, pro-active in its activities, and able to interact with
other agents where necessary. Analysis and construction of MASs is central
to issues such as problem solving, coordination, cooperation and control with,
and of, multiple agents. The agent paradigm, and the ensuing methods for
modelling and representing agents and systems, are geared towards supporting
these research aims.
The specification of a MAS means building a representation of the agents,
and possibly the enclosing environment, that constitute the system. A common
route to specifying more sophisticated agents involves attributing mental states
to them. The well known Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI) model [38] uses:
• beliefs to represent the agent’s (possibly incomplete and incorrect) infor-
mation about itself, other agents, and its environment;
• desires to represent the agent’s long-term aims; and
• intentions to capture aims that are actively being pursued.
The agent then deliberates over what desires to target, how to tackle them
and what actions to take. The BDI model has been very influential and has
consequently been altered and extended with a range of other mental states
such as actions, obligations, abilities etc, and various logics, such as epistemic,
doxastic, deontic and temporal logics, have been developed and successfully
applied to represent these states.
Unlike typical MASs, digital crowds are not deliberate systems. In a MAS
each agent is an individual that is fully identified by her mental state. Illustra-
tively, the agent is the entity of interest and we specify the environment and
the other agents, including the MAS, as seen through her “mental eye”. Even
when a MAS of several agents is specified, all agents in the system are specified
individually one by one by representing their mental states.
In a digital crowd, no part of the participants’ mental states may be made
available to other agents as part of the process in which they are involved.
7
Therefore we cannot represent the crowd participants one by one, as none of
their mental states may be known.
What is known of the digital crowd participants is the messages they ex-
change within the crowd. It is the information exchanged between the agents
that are the focus of our interest, because this is where interesting phenomena
can emerge. We propose that such exchanges are what need to be specified in
order to specify a digital crowd.
Agent-oriented software engineering [24, 52] is a research area specifically
concerned with developing methods for engineering applications conceptualised
as MASs [29]. Within agent-oriented software engineering, logic-based formal
methods are used to specify systems, program systems, and verify systems [10].
The agent specification languages that drive current agent model-checking sys-
tems are inadequate for specifying the structural complexity of digital crowds
(see our discussion in Section 2). In this paper, we develop an improved logic-
based agent specification language that overcomes the shortcomings. Commu-
nication among agents in a MAS is considered to be an act and implemented
as such, see e.g., [6, 30, 51]. Here we are not concerned with how the agents
exchange messages, but with the content of such messages as a special, public
part of the mental state of the agent in a social setting.
The paper is structured as follows. To distinguish the requirements for
an improved agent specification language for digital crowds, we first discuss in
more detail the difference between the “typical” MAS and digital crowds and the
shortcomings of existing agent logics-based languages and logics in Section 2. In
Section 3 we propose an extension to the BDI agent paradigm, and in Section 4
we propose an agent specification language. In Section 5 we present examples
of verification routes for crowdsourcing using our specification. In Section 6 we
discuss conclusions and future work.
2 Problem Analysis
Within crowdsourcing platforms, a digital crowd is typically considered as a
single entity (not an agent structure) whose intentions, beliefs or goals cannot
be known, but whose incentives can be foreseen. So, while being fully aware
that there could be vast numbers of agents accessing the platform, and that the
content of the communication is visible to all these agents, the seekers commu-
nicate with the digital crowd as they would with one particular agent. This one
agent is an embodiment of the crowd, not its leader, but rather a representative
agent; a typical agent in the crowd that embodies all the properties that the
seeker finds desirable in the agent(s) he or she would ideally task with their
problem.
Another common facet of crowdsourcing is that agents within the digital
crowds are not expected to interact with each other privately, or even directly
communicate with each other (some platforms that host crowdsourcing pro-
cesses do not even provide the means for such interactions). Nevertheless, the
participants are encouraged to communicate with other agents outside the digi-
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tal crowd by sharing information involving the crowdsourcing process, and this
type of communication is facilitated by the platform. Consider for example, the
“share on social network” and “email to a friend” buttons embedded in many
such platforms.
Although an agent may not be allowed to join a digital crowd if it lacks
certain skills or characteristics, within the digital crowd no informational or
motivational attitudes are shared. Even in the case of smart mobs, the moti-
vations and beliefs driving each agent to participate in the mob may differ. If
enough agents happen to have similar states of mind, a mob will occur. Ex-
cluding collaboration and the sharing of mental states from the agent structure
makes a digital crowd different from a “traditional” MAS.
Horling et al. [22] give an extensive overview of multi-agent structures such
as coalitions, teams, societies etc. We provide a brief overview to compare these
structures with digital crowds. We first distinguish between a shared attitude
and a we-attitude. In the literature the we-attitude is called a joint attitude, but
we here use we-attitudes to distinguish better from the shared attitudes. The
difference is subtle: a shared attitude is an attitude that conditions participation
in a structure, e.g., if your goal is to achieve ϕ, then you are part of the agent
structure. Illustratively, since your colleague John wants to play football, he is
part of the university football team. In contrast, a we-attitude is an attitude
that characterises participation in a structure, e.g., we (as an organisation) have
the goal to achieve ϕ, so if you are part of the structure then your goal is ϕ as
well. Illustratively, we are married therefore we-intend to abstain from intimate
relations with other agents.
A coalition is an agent structure in which each agent is committed to pursuing
a we-goal. An agent institution, or society, is a structure in which members have
certain we-beliefs and we-obligations of compliance with certain norms. This
does not mean that if a norm is violated the entire institution is subject to
punitive measures, rather that if an agent is a member of the institution, then
he or she is subject to the institutional norms and sanctions. Collaboration is
not essential, either in coalitions or in institutions. A team is a structure of
agents that collaborate, by assuming different roles, towards accomplishing a
shared goal.
Digital crowds, and crowds in general, exhibit a dual nature: both that
of a single agent and a structure of agents. On one hand, the whole crowd
can be viewed as one rational agent. The crowd can be given a task, can be
considered accountable for transgressions e.g., in the case of smart mobs [39],
where the crowd exhibits behaviour emergence and abilities not pertinent to any
one participant. On the other hand, the participants in the crowd are individual
rational agents, in the sense that they are fully autonomous, undertaking only
those tasks they choose to [54].
Comparing how agent structures are specified, we can observe that in coali-
tions, teams, even institutions, the agents either share mental attitudes or adopt
we-attitudes. Consequently, it is possible to represent the agent structure bot-
tom up, by representing all the constituent agents’ shared and/or we-attitudes.
However, neither crowds nor crowd participants can be modelled in this manner
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since, in a digital crowd, agents neither share attitudes nor adopt we-attitudes.
Therefore, we cannot obtain a digital crowd specification using the bottom up
approach of specifying each individual agent of the crowd. Furthermore, specify-
ing each crowd agent is both unnecessary and difficult, as the number of agents
in the crowd is potentially vast and constantly changing.
To specify a crowd, we must encapsulate (hide) the mental states of the
agent in the representation. This allows us to represent agent structures, such
as digital crowds, as single agents within larger structures, such as platforms. We
can represent each agent with the attitudes it decides to reveal to its environment
or the structures with the attitudes that all its members have in common. By
introducing encapsulation, we effectively construct structures top down: first
the agent structure is represented, then agents are distinguished by adding more
detailed information about their mental states.
Agent specification languages do not represent communication. Collabora-
tion in agent structures is formally represented as a we-mental attitude. Even-
tually the act, not the content, of communicating is represented as an action.
How can we specify an agent in an agent structure without specifying his/her
mental attitudes?
Consider an imageboard, an Internet forum where members can post images
available to be viewed by other members or visitors without restriction. The
forum is a context that contains a crowd of unspecified agents that pop in and
out of existence. This forum context exhibits the characteristics of an agent and,
clearly, the members and visitors are also agents. How can we represent this
system of agents without peering into the mental states of the agents involved?
Mental states aim to capture the behavior of an agent. Publicly accessible
messages passed between an agent and a structure, e.g., crowdsourcing platform,
can be used to capture the behavior of a complex system of agents. Such
messages can be either sent to the agent or sent by the agent. When accessing
a forum either as an administrator, visitor or member, the messages posted on
the forum are what can be seen and are what is used to make deductions about
the system as a whole and individual agents within it. We need to be able to
express not only the fact that a message has occurred but also what the content
of the message was, so that we are able to represent the information that agents
wish to disclose to their environment, to give incentives to digital crowds, and
allow agents to reason with them.
A clear distinction between agent specification and the field of agent com-
munication is needed. Agent communication is a vast area of research within
engineering multi agent systems, with considerable work having taken place on
developing communication protocols [6, 30, 33, 51]. Agent communication lan-
guages [44], such as the FIPA-ACL proposed by FIPA (http://www.fipa.org),
and increasingly captured as OWL ontologies [18], are languages designed to be
used by agents to communicate among themselves within a MAS.
Within the research in agent communications, the communication between
agents is represented as an act, in the sense that for example, an autonomous
vacuum cleaner is capable of vacuuming dust and communicating its location to
its docking station. While consideration is given to the allowed content of the
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messages exchanged, the agent does not internalise, i.e., represent as a mental
state, the fact that a message happened. This is typical of all acts when MAS
are implemented. For example, the fact that dirt is collected by the vacuum
cleaner is not internalised after the cleaner vacuums. The agent can detect a
change in his environment (its dirt container is now non empty) as an effect
of having successfully executed the action of vacuuming, but no information
state is added that represents the fact that vacuuming has taken place. The
autonomous vacuum cleaner will receive a message with content “stop” from the
owner, and as a result of that message it will stop its actions, but the fact that
a message with content stop has been received is not part of the informational
states of the cleaner.
We are here not concerned with communication protocols or the implemen-
tation of the communication acts among agents. Instead, we are exclusively
concerned with representing, as information states, the information that a mes-
sage has been sent, or received, and the content of that message. So we represent
the intermediary step, the addition to the information state of the agent of the
fact that communication happened. This happens after the communication act
was executed.
We have to further make clear the difference between a specification and
communication language. A specification language is designed to describe the
overall behaviour of a system, such as e.g., a multi agent system. We specify
what is said to, and by, an agent, but this may not be the language that the agent
actually uses to execute communication. Consider an illustrative example. An
example of agents communicating using English is when John says to Mary: “I
will go to play football.” An example of English used as a specification language
is when we as the designers of this example describe the John-Mary interaction:
John has informed Mary of his intention to engage in the football play activity.
English, as logic, can be used for both communication and specification, but
we are here concerned only about the specification aspect. For the challenges
regarding agent communication languages in social settings, which do have an
overlap with the challenges for specification languages for systems of agents, one
can see for example [44].
3 From Agent to Agent Structure
A rational agent takes action in order to achieve its goals based on the beliefs it
holds about its environment and other agents [53]. A rational agent is typically
described by representing its dynamic, informational and motivation aspects,
i.e., its mental attitudes. This often conforms to the BDI model [38, 37]; recall
that“BDI” denotes Beliefs, Desires, and Intentions. There are many different
agent programming languages and agent platforms based, at least in part, on the
BDI approach. Particular languages developed for programming rational agents
in a BDI-like way include AgentSpeak [36], Jason [4], 3APL [20], Jadex [34],
GOAL [7], SAAPL [49], and Gwendolen [8].
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Private Public
Sent and received
messages
Mental attitudes
Agents contained Contained by agents
Agent
Figure 1: Structure of an extended agent.
In Fig. 1 we present a diagram of an extended agent that will also be used to
specify agent structures. The mental attitudes of the agent are encapsulated in
the private section of the agent, while the public section contains the information
that has been sent to the agent, and the information sent by the agent to
others. In addition to the public and private sections, there is reference to the
other agents (specified in the same manner) that are contained in (respectively,
contain) this agent. So, if a single agent is being specified, the list of agents
contained within it is empty.
We can see, from Fig. 1 that there is a connection between the private and
public sections. This is relevant once the agent decides to internalize some of
the information it receives into its mental states, or when it wants to share some
aspect of its mental states with its environment.
3.1 Encapsulation
An agent is typically considered to be an autonomous software or hardware
entity capable of perceiving its environment, pursuing its own goals and inter-
acting with the environment and with other agents. Initially, it might appear
that the agent paradigm is not appropriate for modelling digital crowd partic-
ipants, since it applies to software and hardware entities, while digital crowds
are comprised almost exclusively of people. However, people do not directly
participate in the digital crowd — their participation is almost exclusively by
medium of a user account, effectively their software avatar. We can build a
representation of the avatar and extend it with a representation of the expected
behaviour of the agent.
The formal description of flexible agent structures was developed in [17] in
the context of executable agent specifications. There, to the formal specification
of the agent’s mental attitudes, two additional sets are added: content and
context. These correspond to the two sets given in Fig. 1, and allow groups,
teams or organizations of agents to be dually treated as individual agents. For
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example, as the environment is described as a set of agents within the context
then, if a message is to be sent into the environment, it is just broadcast to the
context agents. Crucially, there is no distinction between an agent that contains
others and one that does not; effectively, organisations such as crowds can be
themselves viewed as agents.
In [16, 19] this agent specification approach is extended further to include
an agent’s specification that is visible, or accessible, to the agent’s content or
context respectively. Effectively this means that one part of the agent is visible
to the agent’s content and another part, possibly the same, is visible to the
agent’s context. This extension allows for the “typical” agent structures, in
which the agents have joint or shared attitudes, to be represented. We give a
simple example of a team using this representation in Fig. 2. The agent team
has, in its content, all the agents T1, T2, T3. The team agent has we-attitudes
visible to its content, in this example it is the intention to “move the sofa”,
but nothing in its private specification. The agents Ti have their own shared
attitudes, in this example the belief that the agent in question can “lift” (the
sofa), visible to the context and in the private specification, the rest of their
mental attitudes.
Private
Agents contained
T1
T3
T2
 
Public
Contained
by agents
environment 
I move sofa
Public
Contained
by agents
team
B me can lift
Spec of Ti
Private
Agent TiAgent team
Agents contained
Figure 2: Representing a team using the agent structure [16].
The context/content extension enables an agent structure to be directly rep-
resented but, regardless of whether the agent specification is private or public, it
is still in a typical BDI specification. What all BDI-oriented agent specification
languages have in common is that they express what the agent “thinks” and
how it “reasons”. Although the agent might choose to reveal some of its men-
tal attitudes, this is still internal information. The information that the agent
wants to share with the environment and other agents might not correspond to,
or even be consistent with, its formal specification. To model a digital crowd
participant we also need to model what the agent “hears” and “says”, poten-
tially hiding what the agent “thinks” from other agents. Thus, to distinguish
what the agent “was told” and “has said” from its own private “thought” be-
haviour we extend the above approach and explicitly represent messages that
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are sent to (and received from) the agent’s content or context. By having this
information explicitly represented, the agent can reason about it and react to it
accordingly.
3.2 Communication as an informational state
A formal specification of an agent is a logic formula that describes its behaviour,
including the information it has about the world, the motivations that drive it,
and the methods that define how it reacts in response to messages. Logics
developed for representing different aspects of agent behaviour include modal
logics of belief (B), goals (G), wishes (W ), desires (D), intentions (I), actions
(⟦A⟧), abilities (A), knowledge (K), etc, all with an underlying temporal and/or
probabilistic basis [41, 15]. Following this tradition, we introduce a new modal
logic operator “M” to handle message passing, representing messages as Mϕ,
where ϕ describes the message content. We here consider that the message
content is a well formed formula for the language used to represent the mental
states of the agent.
There are two basic qualifiers that must be attributed to a message to distin-
guish between messages that have been received and messages that have been
sent. Additionally, it is also necessary to identify the sender or recipient, re-
spectively. To accomplish this distinction we modify the M operator using a
superscript ↑ j denoting messages sent to agent j and ↓ j denoting messages
received from agent j. Thus, given an agent communication specification, in-
cluding M ↑jϕ in the specification requires that the agent has sent a message
with content ϕ to agent j. Similarly, M ↓jϕ represents that the specified agent
has received a message with content ϕ from agent j. However, the modifiers ↑j
and ↓j are insufficient to express complex messages such as incentives.
We further modify the M operator with a type, denoted as a subscript
e.g., M ↑jtypeϕ, clarifying the intended meaning of the message. We distinguish
between four types.
tell denotes information passing, implying the sender informs the receiver
of what its mental state is; for example, M ↑j
tell
Iϕ is a message with
which the specified agent informs agent j of its intention to actively
pursue ϕ (i.e., it has ϕ as an intention).
ask denotes a request for confirmation of state; for example, M ↓j
ask
Iϕ
represents the fact that the agent has received an inquiry from j who
wants to know whether the agent intends to pursue ϕ.
do denotes delegation, extension and transfer of attitudes; for example,
M
↓j
do
Iϕ is a message in which j delegates to the recipient the active
pursuit of ϕ, while M ↑j
do
Bϕ is a message in which the sender extends
the requirement of adopting the belief ϕ to agent j, etc. (Note that,
to send or receive a message of delegation does not mean that the
recipient is obliged to adopt the content.)
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adv denotes announcement, promise and advertisement, and allows agents
to inform others of incentives or constraints and other mental atti-
tudes that are in force for prospective members; for example,M ↑j
adv
Iϕ
denotes that if the recipient j joins the content of the sender, then
i will be asked to adopt the intention ϕ, while M ↓jadvIϕ denotes that
if j is added to the content of the recipient, then j will adopt the
intention ϕ.
Table 1 gives the intuitive interpretation of such communication types in the
specification of agent i.
tell
M
↓j
tell
ϕ M
↑j
tell
ϕ
i is told that ϕ holds for j j is told that ϕ holds for i
ask
M
↓j
ask
ϕ M
↑j
ask
ϕ
j asks: does ϕ holds for i? i asks: does ϕ holds for j?
do
M
↓j
do
ϕ M
↑j
do
ϕ
j says ϕ should hold for i i says ϕ should hold for j
adv
M
↓j
adv
ϕ M
↑j
adv
ϕ
ϕ should hold for i, ϕ should hold for j,
if i were in the content of j if j were in the content of i
Table 1: Intuitive interpretation of the messages in the specification of agent i.
Agent j is an agent different from agent i.
Notation. In the rest of the text, we use the notationM ↑
[⋅]
andM ↓
[⋅]
, respectively
to denote messages of any type, and we use the  symbol when the orientation
of the message (incoming or outgoing) is irrelevant.
The above message type modifiers are inspired by the illocutionary (speech) act
types of [42]. Searle distinguishes among assertives, directives, commissives, ex-
pressives and declarations. We can draw correspondences between our message
types and Searle’s illocutionary types: expressives and messages of type tell,
assertives and messages of type ask, directives and messages of type do, and
commissives and messages of type adv. We do not have a message type that
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corresponds to declarations, which are speech acts that permanently change the
world, such as pronouncing someone as being married, employed etc, because we
do not consider these types necessary for representing digital crowds at present.
Within MAS research, agent languages for the coordination of agents, based
on speech acts, have been developed, e.g., [48, 1]. However, communicating
using these languages, the agents use speech acts, with vocabulary and inter-
pretation of the received messages depending on the specific language used. As
discussed in Section 2, our messages are not speech acts, rather, they are the
agent’s attitudes and the illocutionary act types are used to modify the intended
meaning of the communication, the reason why the message content is sent, or
how the message content is to be interpreted.
Logics have been developed that are concerned with exchange of knowledge
among agents, probably the most notable being dynamic epistemic logic [47].
It is important to outline the difference between our M operator and the com-
munication represented in this logic. Within dynamic epistemic logic, one can
specify information that is communicated to all the agents, called an epistemic
update, as well as knowledge that all the agents possess, i.e., common knowl-
edge. Once an update ϕ occurs, the agent that receives it necessarily changes
her mental states to accommodate ϕ. As a result, from the moment of the up-
date onwards the agent believes that ϕ holds. However, when an agent receives
a message Mϕ, she has a choice of whether to accommodate ϕ in her mental
states or not. In other words, after a message M ↓i
tell
Bϕ or even after a message
M ↓idoBϕ is received, it is not necessary that the agent will have Bϕ as part of her
specification. Explicitly, we do not presume that the agent tells the truth in the
content of a “tell” message. Thus, M ↑i
tell
Bϕ and B¬ϕ are mutually consistent.
4 Logically Specifying Agents
Let Agt be a set of unique agent identifiers, let Prop be a set of atomic propo-
sitions and constants, and Pred be a set of a first-order predicates of arbitrary
arity. We begin by defining a language Lp to be a set of grounded first order
logic formulas without function symbols, namely the set of all ϕp such that
ϕp ∶∶= p ∣ ¬ϕp ∣ ϕp ∧ ϕp ∣ P (x1, . . . , xm)
where p ∈ Prop, P ∈ Pred and x1, . . . , xm ∈ Agt.
We next consider a BDI agent language. Depending on the specific needs for
a specification, different BDI operators can be used but, for demonstrating our
specification approach, we use the modal operatorsB, G and I, to denote agent’s
beliefs, long term goals and actively pursued goals (or intentions), respectively.
We also use an operator, A, to denote that an agent has an ability, Aϕ indicating
that the agent is able to accomplish ϕ. Ability is a more complex mental attitude
and several formalizations are possible, e.g., “ways” [11, 2, 46, 50], depending on
the precise interpretation of ability. To avoid an in-depth philosophical analysis
of the logics of abilities, which is outside of the scope of this work, and to simplify
our modelling language by avoiding the use of actions as logical primitives,
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we resolve to use Aϕ for denoting both procedural knowledge of which action
sequence brings about ϕ and the actual ability to perform an action sequence
that brings about ϕ. The language LBDI is then the set of all formulas ϕ such
that
ϕ ∶∶= ϕp ∣ ¬ϕ ∣ ϕ ∧ϕ ∣ Bϕp ∣ Iϕp ∣ Gϕp ∣ Aϕp,
where ϕp ∈ Lp.
Finally, we define the language for specifying communication among agents,
LM . For this language, temporal logic operators should be specified depending
on the needs of the particular system specified. We use LTL operators in our
examples [15]. Let T be the set of message types T = {tell, ask, do, adv} and Agt
be a set of unique agent identifiers. The language LM is the set of all formulas
θ such that
θ ∶∶= ϕ ∣ ¬θ ∣ θ ∧ θ ∣ ϕUϕ ∣◯ϕ ∣◇ϕ ∣M ↓jx θ ∣M
↑j
x θ,
where ϕ ∈ LBDI and x ∈ T . In the intuitive interpretation of temporal operators:
pUq means that p is continuously true up until the point when q becomes true;
◯r means that r is true in the next moment in time; while ◇s means that s
will be true at some moment in the future.
The messages are sent to an agent j, however either the context set CX or
the content set CN as a whole can be the target of message broadcast. We use
the shorthand5
M ↑CN
[⋅]
ϕ ≡ ⋀
j∈CN
M
↑j
[⋅]
ϕ, M ↑CX
[⋅]
ϕ ≡ ⋀
j∈CX
M
↑j
[⋅]
ϕ.
The language LBDI restricts the nesting of modal operators, while LM forbids
the use of BDI and temporal operators outside of the scope of a message oper-
ator. Thus the agents do not have mental attitudes about the future, e.g., B◊ϕ
“I believe that sometimes ϕ is true” nor BGϕ “I believe I have the goal to
accomplish ϕ”.
Nested messages express meta communication, allowing agents to commu-
nicate about what was communicated to them or by them. However not all
nesting is meaningful. We state constraints as shown in (1) in order to ap-
ply restrictions mandating that all but the innermost and outermost message
operators are dropped, the orientation of the inner most and outermost mes-
sages is retained, as is the type of the innermost operator, while the type of the
5
Note: We define the messages with individual agents, not sets as in [17, 16, 19], because
a message can be broadcast to many agents, but it can be sent from one agent, otherwise the
sender is unknown, which cannot happen here — if your contexts sends you a message it is
from exactly one context.
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outermost operator must be tell.
M ↓i
[⋅]
Mi
[⋅]
⋯Mi
[⋅]
M ↓i
[x]
ϕ↔M ↓i
[tell]
M ↓i
[x]
ϕ
M ↓i
[⋅]
Mi
[⋅]
⋯Mi
[⋅]
M ↑i
[x]
ϕ↔M ↑i
[tell]
M ↑i
[x]
ϕ
M ↑i
[⋅]
Mi
[⋅]
⋯Mi
[⋅]
M ↓i
[x]
ϕ↔M ↑i
[tell]
M ↓i
[x]
ϕ
M ↑i
[⋅]
Mi
[⋅]
⋯Mi
[⋅]
M ↑i
[x]
ϕ↔M ↑i
[tell]
M ↑i
[x]
(1)
We assume that (some of) the agent abilities are transferable and thus messages
such as M ↓i
do
Aϕ and M ↑i
do
Aϕ represent the transfer of abilities from agent i to
the sender and vice versa, respectively. Messages such as M ↑i
adv
Aϕ represent
transfer of abilities after the agent i has joined the content of the sender.
We can now give the following definition of an agent.
Definition 1 Let Agt be a set of unique agent identifiers. An agent is a tuple
⟨ID ,Bel, Int,Goal,Ablt,Com,CN,CX⟩, where ID ∈ Agt is a unique agent iden-
tifier, Bel ⊂ Lp is the set of beliefs the agent holds about the world, Int ⊂ Lp
is the set of the agent’s intentions, Goal ⊂ Lp is the set of the agent’s goals,
Ablt ⊂ Lp is the set of the agent’s abilities, Com ⊂ LM is the set of messages
the agent has received and sent, CN ⊂ P(Agt ∖ {ID}) is the set of agents con-
tained and lastly CX ⊂ P(Agt ∖ {ID}) is the set of agents in which the agent
is contained, i.e., its set of contexts. Each of the sets Bel, Int, Goal and Ablt
are consistent and simplified.
Given an agent i ∈ Agt, an agent specification is a set SPEC (i) ⊂ LM , where
Bϕ is true iff ϕ ∈ Bel, Gϕ is true iff ϕ ∈ Goal, Iϕ is true iff ϕ ∈ Int, Aϕ is true
iff ϕ ∈ Ablt, cn(j) is true iff j ∈ CN , cx(j) is true iff j ∈ CX and Mi
[⋅]
ϕ is true
if Mi
[⋅]
ϕ ∈ Com.
Note that, to be able to reason about contents and contexts, we introduce special
formulas in SPEC (i), namely cn(j) and cx(j). The formula G cx(j) within
SPEC (i) expresses i’s goal to have j as a context agent, and similarly G cn(j)
within SPEC (i) denotes the goal to include j in his content. Symmetrically
G ¬cx(j) and G ¬cn(j) express the goal to remove j from ones own context, or
content, respectively.
Lastly, we assume, via (2), that if a message is sent then it will eventually be
received. This is a property of communication among agents that should hold
in the environment, for communication to be meaningful.
∃i,M ↑j
[⋅]
ϕ ∈ SPEC (i)⇒ ∃j,◊M ↓i
[⋅]
ϕ ∈ SPEC (j) (2)
Note that we do not develop an axiomatisation for LM and do not intend
to prove soundness for this language, because we intend ultimately to use it
to create specifications for model checking, where soundness is not necessary.
The above, together with standard modal and temporal logic semantic struc-
tures [45], provides a formal basis for describing digital crowd structures, com-
munication and, hence, behaviour.
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5 Specification and Verification of Digital Crowds
We demonstrate the applicability of the specification notation above by consid-
ering two digital crowd examples, and describing the verification processes that
can be deployed.
Throughout, we assume that verification tools for individual agents, such
as those available to analyse the BDI properties of Java-based agents [9], can
be utilised to assess individual agents. We here show, using examples, how
the specification language we have developed is appropriate for describing and
reasoning about the crowd behaviour, and that properties we might wish to
establish of the crowd can be built up from the properties of individual agents.
Note also that, while the proofs we outline are provided by us, we would expect
automated (or, at least, semi-automated) provers to be able to generate these
in a straight-forward way.
We begin by discussing some common aspects of digital crowds.
In a (digital) crowd, the agents are highly autonomous with goals, and attitudes
in general, beyond a seeker’s control. As a consequence, agents cannot be given
a goal, they can only be inspired, or be provided with incentives, to adopt a goal
themselves. In economics, an incentive is considered to be a cost or benefit that
motivates decisions or actions of agents. As observed in the multitude of work
concerned with crowdsourcing, e.g., [12, 21, 26, 40], one of the key features of
the crowdsourcing process is the provision of incentives, by the seeker, in the
form of benefits to the agents that (successfully) participate in the crowdsourcing
process. We can specify, as an advertisement, a conditional future possibility to
benefit with the schema (3).
[INC] ∶ Mupdownarrowsi
adv
(conditions → ◊reward). (3)
The incentive (3) is a message of type “promise”. The premise conditions of
the message is a formula describing the required skills, the pursuit of required
goals, etc., that could lead to benefit in the content of the sender. The reward is
the benefit that an agent can obtain, such as money, goods, recognition, status,
etc. In our examples we use the formula “A earn” as a general representation
for an earned reward.
In the same manner as specifying positive incentives, those that promise
gain, we can also specify negative incentives that promise a penalty. In this case,
the conditions specify what the agent should refrain from, e.g., intentions not
to be upheld, and instead of ◊reward as a consequent we would have ◊penalty .
While penalties are of interest in agent structures such as institutions, in crowd-
sourcing, penalties are not commonly utilized; therefore we investigate them no
further here.
We cannot, nor do we want to, access the mental states of each of the
agents of the crowd, but we can look at the exchanged messages and, based on
assumptions about how an agent interprets those messages, we can establish
certain properties of a crowd.
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5.1 Information Retrieval
We next consider an example in which the retrieval of a particular item of
information is crowdsourced, such as finding a suspect’s name (in our case,
Nemo) from an image in a criminal investigation. We want to formally ascertain
that Nemo will be found under the assumption that there exists an agent in the
crowd who knows where Nemo is, as long as some simple assumptions for the
relations among the agents in the crowd hold as well.
Note that, making assumptions about a system and then verifying that under
these assumptions certain properties hold is not unusual in formal verification.
While the exact state of a system cannot always be known, assuming that
the system is in the required state, we can ensure that a desired state can be
reached. This allows us to be certain that, when operational conditions allow,
correct behaviour will ensue; it also allows us to explore assumptions concerning
failure in any of these operational conditions — if the pre-requisites we expect
are not actually present, then what can the behaviour of the system be?
In order to consider communication among crowds, let us define the concept
of reachability between two agents i and j. The agent i can reach agent j
if, and only if, a message sent from i is eventually forwarded to j, under the
assumption that the relevant context relay messages from one of their content
agents to the rest of the content. We first define relaying contexts. Intuitively, a
relying context is an agent which broadcasts to all its content agents all messages
received from one of his content agents.
Definition 2 Let i be an agent s.t. CN(i) ≠ ∅. Agent k ∈ CX(i) is a relaying
context, and REL(k) is true, when all the messages sent to k are sent on to all
of the content agents of k:
((CN(i) ∨CX(i))∧M ↓i
tell
ϕ) →M ↑CN
tell
ϕ) ∈ SPEC (k)
Clearly, there are messages that an agent sends to a content that are not to be
shared, and should be kept private, but these can be specifically designated as
such. The reachability between two agents is now defined recursively.
Definition 3 Agent j is directly reachable for agent i if at least one of the
following is true:
• ∃k ∈ CX(i)∩CX(j) s.t. REL(k) holds.
• ∃k1 ∈ CX(i) and ∃k2 ∈ CX(j) s.t. CN(k1)∩CN(k2) ≠ ∅ and REL(k1)∧
REL(k2) holds.
Agent j is reachable for agent i if at least one of the following is true:
• j is directly reachable for agent i .
• ∃k ∈ Agt s.t. k is reachable for i and j is reachable for k.
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a) j is directly reachable for i
b) j is  reachable for i
Figure 3: Examples of direct reachability and reachability.
In Fig. 3, we give an example of directly reachable (Fig. 3(a)) and reachable
(Fig. 3(b)) agents.
The set of all agents that are reachable for i is called the neighbourhood
of i, NGH (i). Determining whether j ∈ NGH (i), under the assumption that
all context agents are relaying contexts, can be solved as an ST-connectivity
problem [32].
There are always certain assumptions that have to be made concerning the
behaviour of members of a digital crowd. We will make the assumptions that
the following formulas are included in the SPEC of every agent in Agt:
∗ An agent is always pursuing the goal to earn (increase her utility):
G earn. (4)
∗ An agent always shares information with its content and context about
any possibilities to earn, namely incentives are forwarded:
M
↓j
adv
INC →M ↑CN
tell
M
↓j
adv
INC . (5)
M
↓j
advINC →M
↑CX
tell M
↓j
advINC . (6)
∗ A forwarded incentive is treated the same as directly received incentive:
M ↓ktellM
↓j
advINC →M
↓j
advINC . (7)
∗ An agent always responds to an incentive whose conditions it can satisfy:
(conditions ∧Greward ∧M ↓jadv(conditions → ◊reward)) →M
↑j
tellconditions .
(8)
∗ An agent is required to have the abilities it claims to have, hence it will
tell someone that it has a certain ability only if it really has it:
M
↑j
tell
Aϕ→ Aϕ. (9)
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∗ An agent that actively pursues a goal, and has the ability to accomplish
its goal, will eventually (believe that she will) have accomplished his goal:
(Aϕ ∧ Iϕ) → ◊Bϕ. (10)
Assumptions about the behaviour of the crowd can be based on a statistical
analysis of the agents that access a platform of interest, or by only allowing
agents with desirable properties to access the platform. Thus, a condition that
all contexts are relaying messages can be established by ensuring a platform
in which all communication among the members of a structure is visible to
all others (consider as an example a Facebook wall). It is important to note
that, if we move to a different infrastructure, we might modify or even remove
some of these assumptions. The key point is that the specification formalism is
appropriate for describing these.
In addition to the general assumptions (4)-(10) we make the following spe-
cific assumptions for SPEC (seeker) within this particular information retrieval
scenario.
∗ If an incentive was advertised that required the ability find Nemo and
an agent tells us that it has such an ability, then delegate the task of
find Nemo to that agent:
(M ↑CX
adv
(A find Nemo → ◊A earn)∧M ↓k
tell
A find Nemo) →M ↑k
do
I find Nemo.
(11)
∗ If a task to find Nemo was delegated to an agent k, and a message was
received from k that Nemo is found, then the belief that Nemo is found is
adopted:
(M ↑k
do
I find Nemo ∧M ↓k
tell
B find Nemo) → B find Nemo. (12)
Note that, because of (11), all agents that have reported an ability to find Nemo
will be assigned the task to find Nemo. From (12), it follows that as soon as
one of the delegated agents reports that Nemo is found, the respective belief
will be adopted.
We also make additional assumptions for the SPEC of the agents in Agt.
∗ If we had told an agent that we have the ability to find Nemo, and that
agent delegated to us the finding of Nemo, then we will indeed adopt the
intention to find Nemo:
(M ↑i
tell
A find Nemo ∧M ↓i
do
I find Nemo) → I find Nemo. (13)
∗ If we believe that the find Nemo task has been accomplished, and we
were delegated by an agent to find Nemo, then we tell that agent that we
believe Nemo is found:
(B find Nemo ∧M ↓i
do
I find Nemo) →M ↑i
tell
B find Nemo. (14)
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We aim to verify whether property (16) holds for agent seeker when the platform
is such that property (15) is satisfied (Agt is the set of all agents in the platform).
Property (15) expresses that there is at least one agent in the neighbourhood
of the Seeker that is able to find Nemo. Recall that the communication among
agents is something that can be accessed by other agents, therefore we establish
that an agent has an ability if it has said it has.
∗ There is at least one agent j in the neighbourhood of the seeker that has
communicated possessing the ability to find Nemo to some agent k, or
was told by k that k has the ability to find Nemo:
∃j ∈ NGH (seeker), M ↑k
tell
A find Nemo ∈ SPEC (j) or M ↓k
tell
A find Nemo ∈ SPEC (j).
(15)
∗ It is always true that if we advertise the incentive that the ability to find
Nemo can lead to a reward (arbitrarily long), then eventually Nemo will
be found:
◻ (M ↑seeker
adv
(A find Nemo → ◊A earn) → ◊B find Nemo). (16)
Let j be the agent that is in NGH (seeker) s.t. M ↑ktellA find Nemo ∈ SPEC (j),
namely the agent that makes (15) true. Following from (7) and (8), we have
that j (in SPEC (j)) it will eventually obtain the advert from the seeker:
◊M ↓seeker
adv
(A find Nemo → ◊A earn).
Since (15) is true, and due to (9), (4) and (8), the seeker will eventually be
contacted by j, namely SPEC (seeker) contains
◊M ↓j
tell
A find Nemo.
When M ↓j
tell
A find Nemo ∈ SPEC (seeker) and, due to (11) and (12), we have
that j (in SPEC (j)) will eventually obtain the delegation from the seeker:
◊M ↓seekerdo I find Nemo.
Due to (13), (14) and (10) the seeker will eventually be told (by j) that
I find Nemo:
◊M
↓j
tell
B find Nemo.
Lastly, due to (11) and (12), we obtain that ◊B find Nemo ∈ SPEC (seeker)
and so, eventually, the seeker will believe that Nemo has been found.
5.2 Software Analysis
As a second example we consider a larger task, namely checking the correctness
of a substantial piece of software. The task is broken down into small “human
intelligence” tasks of similar complexity each of which is then crowdsourced.
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Testers
s1
sn
si
sj
Figure 4: A crowd of specification testers.
Each software fragment is considered (in)correct if two out of three crowd mem-
bers agree on its classification. We need to verify not only that the crowd will
check the whole of the software, but also that the software can be kept confiden-
tial, namely no individual crowd member can gain access to the full software,
nor deduce the whole of the software from the fragments he or she is checking.
Assume that the software S is fragmented into n chunks σ1, σ2, . . . , σn. To
be able to participate in the process an agent must have the required software
skill level. This is tested as a condition of entry into the crowd. The crowd that
tests the code contains all the agents that have been so vetted. The structure of
this crowd, encapsulated in Testers, is given in Fig. 4. In the content of Testers,
there are as many context-agents as there are subsystems. Individual crowding
agents can choose which context they want to join, but they may not be allowed
to join some or all of them, based on other contents they are members of. The sk
agents send their content lists to Testers. Then, any content-respective software
fragment is only sent to members of the content.
The relations among the software fragments are given in the specification
of Testers, in form of (Bσx ∧ ⋯ ∧ Bσz) → B whole, for some {σx, . . . , σz} ⊂
{σ1, σ2, . . . , σn}. In addition, formulas (17-20) are included as part of the spec-
ification for Testers.
∗ Forward any incentives to the testers:
M ↓siadv(A test → ◊A earn) →M
↑CN
tell M
↓si
adv(A test → ◊A earn). (17)
∗ S is tested when each fragment is reported as tested:
B tested(S) ↔ (M ↓sx
tell
B tested(σx) ∧⋯∧M ↓sxtellB tested(σz)). (18)
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∗ If an agent is safe for a fragment x, it can be added to context sx:
M ↓sx
tell
M ↓i
tell
I cx(sx) ∧B safe(i, sx) →M ↑sxtellB ok(i). (19)
∗ An agent is safe for a fragment x, if it cannot deduce the whole software
system from the fragment x and the fragments already sent to it6:
¬((( ⋀
B safe(i,sz),z≠x
Bσz) ∧Bσx → B whole)) → B safe(i, sx). (20)
The formulas (21–26) are part of the specification for sx.
∗ An incentive is sent:
M ↑Testers
adv
(A test → ◊A earn). (21)
∗ If an agent is interested in joining the context sx, and the software frag-
ment is not yet tested, then Testers is told about this (and implicitly asked
to approve the safety of the agent):
(M ↓i
tell
G cx(sx)∧¬B approve(σx)∧¬B reject(σx)) →M ↑Testerstell M
↓i
tell
I cx(sx).
(22)
∗ If an agent is vetted, it is entrusted with a fragment for testing:
M
↓sj
tell
B ok(i) →M ↑i
do
I test(σx). (23)
∗ If two out of three agents (i, j and k are different) approve the fragment,
then the fragment is considered as being approved:
(M ↓i
tell
B approve(σx) ∧M ↓jtellB approve(σx) ∧ (M
↓k
tell
B approve(σx) ∨ (24)
M ↓k
tell
B reject(σx))) → B approve(σx).
∗ If two out of three agents (again, i, j and k are different) reject the frag-
ment, then the fragment itself is rejected:
(M ↓i
tell
B reject(σx) ∧M
↓j
tell
B reject(σx) ∧ (M ↓ktellB approve(σx) ∨ (25)
M ↓k
tell
B reject(σx))) → B reject(σx).
∗ When the whole code fragment is approved or rejected, Testers is informed:
(B approve(σx) ∨B reject(σx)) →M ↑Testerstell B tested(σx). (26)
6If B whole somehow becomes true independent of the specification provided by the testers
then this formula will prevent any agent being deduced safe for any fragment. This represents
a “fail safe” situation – no more fragments will be assigned and risk compromising the confi-
dentiality of the software but obviously the task can not be completed in this circumstance.
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Finally, every crowd-member is assumed to have the formulas (27–32) in its
specification:
∗ It is an agent’s goal to earn, and it is able to test software:
G earn ∧ A test. (27)
∗ If it is able to test software and it actively pursues the goal to test software
then eventually the software will be either approved or rejected:
A test(σx) ∧ I test(σx) → ◊(B approve(σx) ∨B reject(σx)). (28)
∗ If an incentive is received, then pursue this to seize the opportunity:
M ↓Testers
tell
M ↓sx
adv
(A test → ◊A earn) →M ↑sx
tell
G cx(sx). (29)
∗ If delegated a code fragment to test, then adopt the intention to do so:
M ↓sx
do
I test(σx) → I test(σx). (30)
∗ Any code fragment can be either approved or rejected, but not both:
(B approve(σx)∧¬B reject(σx))∨(¬B approve(σx)∧B reject(σx)). (31)
∗ When the code is tested, send the results to the relevant context:
B approve(σx) →M ↑sxtellB approve(σx). (32)
B reject(σx) →M ↑sxtellB reject(σx).
Establishing that (33) holds for Testers should then be straightforward.
◊B tested(S)∧ ◻(M ↑sx
tell
B ok(i) → B safe(i, sx)). (33)
5.3 Utilising the Formal Basis
Above we have given two examples showing both how our formal syntax can
be used to specify digital crowd scenarios, and then how formal verification
processes can use these specifications to establish properties. The important
aspects concerning this process are:
1. the general properties of the crowd, and environment, are formalised using
our language;
2. the specific properties of individual agents within the digital crowd are
also formalised using the same language;
3. we also formalise any assumptions we make about agent (hence, human)
or environmental behaviour;
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4. for an individual agent, formal verification of its properties can be carried
out by invoking existing agent model-checking tools such as [9], which
prove that all possible executions of the agent conform to the logical re-
quirements;
5. once proved for individual agents, reasoning about combined properties
can take place, either using manual proof (as above) or by some form of
automated process (note there are many automated provers for modal and
temporal logics); and
6. once complete, we have verified properties of the digital crowd scenario
under the assumptions specified and so can be sure what behaviour will
occur (if the assumptions are satisfied).
Once this process is complete, it is natural to then revisit the assumptions,
weaken them and see if the verification can still be carried through. If it cannot,
then we can see where the required behaviour can fail and so can either take this
back to the crowd application designer, or weaken the properties being verified.
And so on. The process continues in this way until sufficient verified behaviour
has been extracted. Note that we clearly cannot completely specify all crowd
behaviour, but can explore classes of behaviour and prove what will occur under
these assumptions.
6 Summary
Over the last few years, the business practice of crowdsourcing has begun to
capture the attention of computer scientists. All crowdsourcing processes involve
the participation of a digital crowd, a large number of agents that access a single
Internet platform or web service. Although a digital crowd is a collection of
agents, it is not a structure traditionally studied within the area of multi-agent
systems. Logic-based formal methods are available for analysing the behavior
of, and the dynamics within, a multi-agent system before the actual system is
constructed. In particular, the formal verification of systems is the process of
establishing that a designed system has the intended properties. Crowdsourcing
can be made more reliable and effective by applying such logic-based formal
methods by, for example, determining important properties of a digital crowd,
under given assumptions about its members, before the crowd is assembled.
Our aim is to enable automated formal verification, in particular model-
checking, to be utilised in digital crowd systems, and crowdsourcing in general.
To this end we extend the paradigm of an agent, in particular a BDI agent, as
used in traditional multi-agent systems. Our extended agent encompasses both
communication behaviour and further individual agents and sub-structures. We
accomplish this by abstracting from the member agents’ mental states and di-
rectly specifying the communication exchanged by the agents.
We proposed an abstract agent specification language, adding the represen-
tation of messages to a temporal BDI language. Although most agent pro-
gramming languages allow messages to be passed among agents, these messages
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are primarily signals (to stop, go, etc) and are not part of the reasoning within
the agent. The content of agent communication typically is not considered
a separate informational state of the agent. We represent the messages in the
same fashion as the informational, motivational and dynamic mental attitudes
of the BDI agent are represented. While nothing is assumed about the mental
states of a particular agent, the information it exchanges with other agents can
be sufficient to reason about a structure in which that agent belongs, and can
represent loose social structures such as digital crowds. To exhibit this, we de-
velop two examples to illustrate how our formal specification language can be
used as the basis for formally describing properties of a digital crowd.
The possibility of applying formal methods to digital crowds opens many
interesting avenues for future research. Model-checking requires the presence of
an executable model of the system under investigation. There are executable
specification languages for agent systems based on temporal logic [14, 43] and
we are interested in adapting these so that our specifications can be easily
converted into appropriate executable models. We anticipate that we will need
to develop abstraction mechanisms e.g., a suitable crowd size for a model may be
the number of distinct crowd members referred to in the property description.
Extending the problem with probabilistic aspects would also be of interest.
This would enable reasoning about the probable success of some task given to
a digital crowd based on (stochastic) assumptions about the probable abilities
(and reliability) of members of the crowd. Probabilistic Model-checking tools
(e.g., Prism [27]) could be adapted to study digital crowds.
Finally, while we do not need to axiomatize our specification language to use
it in model-checking it would be interesting to develop an axiomatization for
the M operators and formally study its properties. We currently make no use
of plans and planning in our examples, though planning is an important part
of multi-agent systems and it would be interesting to integrate the problem of
planning with, and for, digital crowds.
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